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Abstract: In West and Central African countries parastatal vertical coordination is used to 
control both the input and output markets. The decline of cotton yields and subsequent 
decline of the parastatals’ performance in the late 1990s called for reforms. This thesis 
assesses the potential economic effects of different institutional structures for the 
parastatals in West and Central Africa, using the characteristics of the cotton sector in 
Burkina Faso. The thesis is based in the concept of economic surplus. A structural system 
is developed to measure the potential economic outcomes of three market alternatives to 
parastatal vertical coordination. Results demonstrate that when a parastatal is allowed to 
exercise market power, it extracts rents from the farmers maximizing the parastatal’s 
economic surplus. The primary beneficiaries of the privatization of the cotton sector in 
West and Central African countries are the farmers, as a result of the higher price 
received in the output market. The parastatal extracts more from the output market than 
from the input market. With partial privatization farmers are better off when they receive 
the competitive cotton price, even when the parastatal exercises monopoly control of the 
input market, extracting rents from the farmers, than they are when the parastatal 
exercises monopsony in the output market (cotton buying) and farmers procure inputs in 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Cotton is one of the most important cash crops in sub-Saharan Africa. In many of 
the countries of the region growing cotton is the primary source of employment in the 
rural areas accounting for a substantial share of the cash income (Elbehri and Macdonald, 
2004). Additionally, it is the prime export commodity in the region, accounting for 15% 
of world cotton exports, ranking third behind the United States and Uzbekistan (Baffes, 
2001). The “C-4” (Cotton-4) countries - Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali - alone 
account for 8% of world cotton exports. However, they have no significant influence on 
world cotton trade (Alston, Sumner, and Brunke, 2007).  
The cotton sector in West and Central African countries is dominated by 
smallholder farmers that normally grow cotton for cash income along with food crops 
(cereals and vegetables) that satisfy family consumption needs. The cotton sector in this 
region has been growing for the past four decades and significantly contributes to the 
economic growth of the sub-Saharan Africa region (Elbehri and Macdonald, 2004; Falck-
Zepeda, Horna, Smale, 2007).  
The West and Central African cotton market is a prime example of an imperfectly 
competitive market which is dominated by state owned cotton companies (parastatals). 
The cotton sector in this region is vertical coordinated with few differences among 
countries. A single parastatal company in each country retains legal monopoly on the 
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input market providing the farmers with many of the necessary non-labor inputs (seed, 
pesticide, urea, extension services, and others) and also legal monopsony on the output 
market, buying all the cotton from the farmers. This parastatal vertical coordination 
system (Figure 1) has allowed the parastatals to set the input and output prices, extracting 
significant rents from the farmers (World Bank, 2000).    
Until recently, the pricing system used in this region was similar in nearly all of 
the countries; the prices were the same across the growing area (panterritorial), fixed 
throughout the growing season (panseasonal), and were set and publicly announced by 
the parastatal before the beginning of the planting season (Badiane et al. 2002, Elbehri 
and Macdonald 2004, Baffes, Tschirley and Gerley, 2009). This pricing system 
guaranteed an anticipated and equal price among the farmers; however, it penalized the 
most efficient and productive ones. Moreover, extracting rents from the farmers 
restrained the potential to reinvest in research, cost minimization technology constraining 
the overall growth of the cotton sector. The system described above allowed for a rapid 
growth of cotton production and exports in the mid-1990s. Despite that, later in the 1990s 
declining of performance of the parastatals, declining cotton yields and prices, and high 
volatility in the sector led to calls for reforms (Baffes, 2007). 
Recent evidence shows that this vertical coordination system (Figure 1) has 
reached its performance peak and it is less likely to survive in this current scenario of 
increasing competition and globalization (World Bank, 2000; Vitale et al., 2009). The 
proposed reforms aimed in order to break down the existing vertical coordination and 
allow for privatization of the sector in order to increase competitiveness and overall 
performance of the sector (Banghdadli, Cheikhrouhou and Raballand, 2007). While this 
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vertical coordination structure continues to prevail in many of the countries, where the 
government still controls the cotton trade, some have undertaken reforms that partially or 
completely liberalized the sector, allowing for the entrance of a limited number of 
ginning companies. However, monopsony power in the output market continues to exist 
(Falck-Zepeda, Horna, Smale, 2007; Vitale et al., 2009). 
Objectives: 
This thesis assesses the potential economic consequences of allowing different 
market structures in the cotton sector in West and Central Africa by developing an 
economic model to compare the potential economic outcomes of departing from the 
current parastatal vertical coordination into more competitive alternatives. More 
specifically, the objective is to determine the prospective gains in the producer’s surplus 
of migrating from the current parastatal vertical coordination to more competitive market 
structures, using the features of the cotton sector system in Burkina Faso. 
The working hypothesis for this paper is that under this current institutional 
structure, monopoly power in the seed industry is undermined by monopsony power in 
the buying of cotton: more rents are extracted from the output rather than input market. 
However, if the cotton industry is privatized a different stream of rents would be 
extracted.  
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. In chapter II a brief literature 
review of the historical background of cotton and the outcomes of reforms in cotton 
sector in West and Central Africa is presented. In chapter III the theoretical framework is 
presented. This is followed by the model specification in chapter IV; in chapter V the 
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procedures and data are presented; and in chapter VI the results are presented and 
discussed, and compared; the last chapter is reserved for final comments and conclusions. 
 
 
Figure 1. Parastatal Vertical coordination system in West and Central Africa.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
2.1 Historical background: Cotton in West and Central Africa 
Cotton was introduced in West and Central African French colonies during the colonial 
era to supply the French textile industry with seed cotton (World Bank, 2000). The cotton 
production and marketing was secured by a French state owned company the 
“Compagnie Française pour le Developpemnent des Fibres Textiles” - CFDT.  Following 
independence in 1960, CFDT remained as a small shareholder, and a number of national 
cotton companies (parastatals) were created in the different countries of the region with 
the local governments retaining the majority of the shares (Gerley and Poulton, 2009). 
From that time, the cotton sector in this region has been dominated by a parastatal 
company in each country that exerts vertical control over the sector from farm to ginning. 
The parastatals, until the pre-reforms era, retained legal monopoly power in input supply 
(seed, pesticide, urea, extension service, and other), marketing, cotton ginning, and 
monopsony power in cotton buying extracting considerable rents from the farmers 
(Baffes, 2007; Vitale et al., 2009; World Bank, 2000).   
The parastatal vertical coordination system (Figure 1) increased the cotton 
farming area, and significantly contributed to the economic growth of the region (Baffes, 
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2007). Figure 2 shows that from 1961 to 2000 the cotton yields in West and Central 
Africa increased by four fold, and production by more than 20 fold (Elbehri and 
Macdonald 2004).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Cotton area and yield trends in West and Central Africa (Source: Elbehri and 
Macdonald, 2004).  
However, recent evidence shows that this system has reached its performance 
peak. Beyond that, the declining performance of the cotton companies, and declining 
world cotton prices and yields, along with financial crises in most of the cotton 
companies, led to calls for reforms attempting to improve competiveness and improve the 
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share of the cotton world price captured by the farmers (World Bank, 2000; Vitale et al., 
2009).  
There are four important and distinguished phases of incentives to the cotton 
farmers in the region. In the first phase, ranging from 1970-1984, cotton farmers received 
roughly one third of the world cotton price; in the second phase, from 1985-1993, which 
was distinguished by poor world cotton prices, high inflation, financial crises of the 
majority of the cotton companies, and heavy financial aid to the cotton companies to face 
the crises the farmers earned up to 55 percent of the world price. The third phase, from 
1994-1997, was marked by a decline of world commodity prices as a result of a financial 
crisis in East Asia with the farmers receiving about 42 percent of the world price. During 
the last phase from 1998 until the early 2000s  world cotton prices declined, majority of 
the cotton companies experienced financial crises, and with the farmers capturing a 
considerably greater portion of the world price (around 59 percent) than historically  
(Baffes, 2007). Historically, cotton farmers in West and Central African countries have 
received poor prices even when the cotton world prices were at their highest levels. 
Reforms of the cotton sector to increase competition and boost the share of the world 
price received by the local farmers have been proposed. These reforms aimed to limit 
government intervention in price setting and subsidies in the cotton market. These 
reforms, accompanied by improvements in the efficiency of the cotton ginners, were 
expected to increase income to cotton farmers and boost cotton production, and the world 
export share of the region. However, in some countries – Burkina Faso and Mali – the 
vertical coordination still prevails owing to the benefits it brought to the sector in the 
countries (Badiane et al., 2002; Baffes, 2007; Gerley and Poulton, 2009). 
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2.2 Moving towards a competitive cotton sector 
Moving to a more competitive cotton sector is not an easy task; and it is expected 
to take several years.  To achieve a successful transition, the reform plan has to take into 
account the particularities and institutional environment in each individual country 
(Badiane et al., 2002). Privatization of the cotton sector in West and Central Africa has 
been recommended to improve management of companies, reduce production costs, and 
limit government intervention. However, privatization has been restrained in most of the 
countries. Experience from the countries that have undertaken these reforms, partially or 
totally privatizing the cotton sector, show that privatization has had positive results 
(Gergely and Poulton, 2009).  
Privatization of the cotton sector and increased investment allowed for countries 
in Africa to revitalize cotton production and the farmers to receive a higher share of the 
world price (Poulton et al., 2004). However, the higher price shares received were rapidly 
lost due to lack of an efficient input market supply, infrastructures, and other services 
required in the cotton production (Gourex and Macrea, 2003, Vitale et al 2009, Poulton et 
al., 2004).  
The primary beneficiaries of the privatization and subsequent elimination of 
market power and other pricing distortions in the cotton sector are the farmers, receiving 
higher world cotton price shares (World Bank, 2000).  Poulton et al. (2004) argue that the 
higher prices incentives in the competitive market make growing cotton more attractive, 
and bringing in more productive and efficient farmers. Furthermore, studies (Gourex and 
Macrea 2003; and Poulton et al., 2004) show that privatization of the cotton sector in sub 
Saharan Africa increased the prices received by the farmers, however results varied when 
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a small number of cotton companies dominated the market. In Tanzania, an example of a 
competitive cotton industry in Southern African the share of the price received by the 
farmers increased rapidly from 49% to 70%, five years following the reforms on the 
sector. While in Zambia and Zimbabwe, countries characterized by a concentrated cotton 
sector dominated by no more than three firms, the gains on the farmers share of the world 
rapidly decreased after the reform period.  
Most West and Central African countries maintained the parastatal vertical 
coordination and have had better farmers price shares compared to the Southern East 
African countries that engaged in reforms of the cotton sector (Kaminski, 2011). This 
performance difference is explained by the increased bargaining power of the farmers in 
the late 1990s. For instance, by 2004 in Burkina Faso part of the farmers owned 30% of 
the cotton company. The cotton prices are now negotiated before the beginning of the 
planting season with the participation of the farmers (Bourdet 2004; Kaminski, 2011). 
The increased bargaining power of the farmers allowed them to quickly raise the share of 
the world price captured by the farmers (Figure 3). The farmer’s price share rapidly 
increased from one third in the mid 1980’s to about 58% in the late 1990s; reaching to a 
high of 73% during the period of 2000-2005 (Tschirley, Poulton, and Labaste, 2009).   
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Figure 3. Producers world price share in West and Central Africa and South eastern 
Countries (Source: Tschirley, Poulton, and Labaste, 2009). 
 
For example, in Tanzania the share of the price captured by the farmers after the late 
1990’s reforms rapidly increased to 70% by 2000-05. This increase in the price share 
received by the farmers was also accompanied by an increase in yields to about 211 kg/ha 
by 1999 (Figure 3).  In Zimbabwe, however, the share of the prices received by the 
farmers rapidly decreased after the reforms took place in the early 1990s accompanied by 
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a decrease in the yields as well; by 2000-05 the share captured by the farmers in 
Zimbabwe had decreased to 49% (Figure 3). 
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CHAPTER III 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The purpose of this thesis is to assess the potential economic consequences of 
three alternative structures to the parastatal vertical coordination in cotton sector in West 
and Central Africa. This study is based on the concept of economic surplus (total welfare) 
as described by Alston et al. (1995), where the producer’s surplus is defined as the total 
revenue minus total costs of production of the good. 
 Reforms to privatize the cotton sector in West and Central African in order to 
improve the competiveness of the sector and allow for the farmers to benefit from 
increased share of the world cotton price have been proposed (Gergely and Poulton, 
2009; Badiane et al., 2002). This study analyzes three alternatives to the current parastatal 
vertical coordination system. The first alternative is to allow for the parastatal to keep 
monopoly control of the input market and let the farmers sell their production in the 
world market. A second alternative is to allow for the producers to procure the inputs in a 
competitive market and let the parastatal act as a monopsonist as it buys cotton, and the 
third alternative is to completely privatize the cotton sector and let the farmers sell their 
production and procure the inputs in the competitive market. 
 
 
13 
 
3.1 Extracting rent from the output 
The quantity produced (S) in the competitive market is derived using the 
producers’ marginal cost, and to compare the world market quantity to the quantity 
produced in the local market a ginning efficiency ratio of 40% is used.  
In Figure 4, S denotes the original cotton supply under competitive conditions, a 
is the reservation price for cotton which is the minimum price required to entice farmers 
to engage in cotton production and it is a function of the prices of other food crops 
(cereals and vegetables); pw is the cotton lint world price (under competitive conditions); 
pp is the demand price the parastatal pays farmers for the cotton; Ql  is the aggregated 
cotton (lint equivalent) quantity supplied by the local market under monopsony power ; 
and Qw  is the cotton lint equilibrium quantity under competitive conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Rent extraction on the output market under monopsony.   
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monopsony power in the output market and sets the price (pp) below the competitive 
market price extracting rent from the farmers. This results in a change in the producer’s 
surplus equal to the difference between the areas adpw and abpp.   
The area pwebpp is the rent the parastatal extracts by enforcing their pricing power 
on the output market, and the area bed is the deadweight loss generated as a result of the 
parastatal monopsony on the cotton buying.  
Using the illustrative example of a single input, in this case urea with 46% of 
nitrogen, the parastatals could induce cotton production by subsidizing the price of the 
urea. The subsidy lowers the urea price paid by farmers from rw (world urea price) to rp 
(urea price the parastatal charges the farmers), boosting the quantity used from Qwi to Zi 
which is the profit maximizing level of urea for the farmers under subsidy (Figure 5).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Parastatal subsidy on the input market. 
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The increased quantity of urea used will have a positive effect on the cotton 
output by increasing the quantity produced from Ql  to Q’l, and shifting the cotton supply 
to the right from S to S’, assuming the cotton lint price in the local market is maintained 
at the same level (pp) below the world price (pw) (Figure  6). This supply shift will 
increase the rent extracted by the parastatal by adding the area ebgf to the area ppbepw 
(rent extracted under the original cotton supply). The change in the producer’s surplus is 
given by the difference between the areas ppga and ppba (Figure 6). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Supply shift due to subsidy on the input (urea) market. 
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3.2 Extracting rent from the input  
If the parastatal extracts rent from the input market by selling urea at a price (r’w) 
higher than the world market price (rw), the quantity of urea used will decrease from Qwi 
to Q’wi (Figure  7).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Extract rent from the input market. 
 
This decrease in the quantity of urea used will negatively impact the output by 
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curve to the left from S to S’’. The rent extracted by the parastatal is equal to the area 
ppjipw, and the change in the producer surplus is given by the difference of the areas ppca 
and ppja (Figure 8).  
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Figure 8. Supply shift due to rent extraction on the input. 
 
3.3 No rent extraction by the parastatal 
With the current parastatal vertical coordination the surplus distribution in the 
cotton sector is unequal. If a more competitive market is permitted by privatizing the 
cotton sector and allowing more companies to enter the market, a different stream of 
rents would be extracted and the farmers would benefit from the higher output prices and 
lower input prices on the competitive market. In a competitive market, the welfare is 
greater than with the parastatal system and the farmers capture the surplus generated so 
the parastatal profit is zero (Vitale et al., 2009). 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
THE STRUCTURAL MODEL 
National cotton companies maximize profit by purchasing cotton from 
smallholder farmers, and contractual agreements require farmers to sell all of their cotton 
to the parastatal at pre-planting announced prices. With vertical control over the cotton 
sector, the parastatal sets both input and output prices, and through extension services is 
able to act as the primary technology provider (Badiane et al. 2002, Elbehri and 
Macdonald 2004, Baffes, Tschirley and Gerley, 2009). Those features are established in 
the theoretical model through decision variables for input and output prices, and their 
influence on aggregate supply. Farmers are price takers, but cotton competes with food 
crops for resources (Tschirley and Gerley, 2009). Opportunity cost of land, labor, and 
capital establish a minimum price for cotton. Aggregate cotton supply is obtained by 
summing over the farming population, which varies across region and farm type (Vitale 
et al., 2009). Given the large number of cotton farmers, aggregate supply is modeled as a 
continuous function. The aggregate cotton production quantity (Ql) and the aggregated 
input (Zi) cost are calculated respectively as:  
(1)    ∑ (       )
 
    
(2)     ∑ (     )
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Where Yic is the cotton yield for the i
th
 farmer in kg/ha, Xic is the area of cotton grown by 
the i
th
 farmer in hectares; zi is the quantity of the urea used by the i
th 
farmer in kg/ha, and 
n is the total number of farmers.  
The farmers are price takers and the parastatal exert their vertical control over the 
cotton market and choose both the input (rp) and output (pp) prices to maximize their 
profit according to Equation 3; however these prices are subject to the farmers 
maximizing their profit as described by Equation 4. 
(3)       (     )    (          )  (     )    (          ) 
Where MaxPI  is the parastatal maximum profit, pw is the cotton lint price in the world  
market in $/kg, rw  is the urea price in the world market in $/kg, Ql is the aggregate 
quantity of cotton lint in the local market in kg, pp is the demand price the parastatal pay 
the farmers for the cotton lint in $/kg, rp is the price of urea the parastatal charges the 
farmers in $/kg, Zi is the aggregated urea quantity supplied to the farmers in the local 
market in kg/ha, and τ is a vector of food crops prices (cereals and vegetables), and μm is 
the price of maize in $/kg. Maize is included because farmers can choose to either plant 
cotton or maize.  
Given the urea (rp) and cotton lint (pp) prices, the farmers choose the area of cotton 
(Xic) and maize (Xim) to plant, and the level of input (zi) to maximize their profit as 
described by the following relationship: 
(4)             (  )     (          )         (  )         
  (          )         (                     ) 
Where MaxFI is the farmers maximum profit, Yic is the cotton yield of the i
th
 farmer in 
kg/ha, Yim is the maize yield for the i
th
 farmer in kg/ha, Xic is the area allocated to cotton 
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by the i
th 
farmer in hectares, Xim is the area allocated to maize by the i
th
 farmer in hectares, 
λland is shadow prices of the land constraint, and       is the level of land available for the 
i
th
 farmer, and   ic and   im are the levels of land required to produce Xic and Xim for the i
th
 
farmer, respectively. 
For the farmer to engage in growing cotton the farmer’s model has to satisfy a break 
even condition that is defined by the following Equation: 
(5)             (          )  (     )     
Where             is the break-even point for farm type i, 0.4 is the ginning efficiency 
ratio, Yic is the cotton yield for the i
th
 farmer in kg/ha, pp is the price the parastatal pay the 
farmers for the cotton lint in $/kg, rp is the urea price the parastatal charges the farmers in 
$/kg, and zi is the quantity of urea used by the i
th
 farmer. 
 
4.1 First-Order Conditions 
The structure of the output supply and input demand equations are explained for the 
situation where the input and output prices are set by the parastatal. In general, parastatals 
can choose to either subsidize or extract rents in a market. Using an illustrative example, 
with a single input (urea), there are four possible combinations, subsidizing or extracting 
rents in the input and output markets. The optimal choice depends on both the size of the 
market and the shape (elasticity) of the supply and demand curves. The exact 
relationships are obtained from the first order conditions (FOC).    
The first order derivatives of the parastatal profit function with respect to pp and 
rp results in the following set of equations: 
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(7) 
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= 0 
The first term in Equation 6 is the marginal loss in revenue when the cotton lint 
domestic price (pp) is increasing, equaling to the aggregated quantity transacted Ql. This 
loss in revenue occurs since higher demand prices (pp) reduce the parastatal price margin, 
decreasing the parastatal profit. The second term represents the marginal increase in 
revenue from enforcing pricing power on the output market, with magnitude proportional 
to the slope of the supply curve. When the cotton price (pp) increases the aggregated 
quantity of cotton supplied (Ql) increasing the parastatal profit. More elastic supply 
enables greater pricing power. The third term is unique to the vertical coordination 
problem; it represents how enacting pricing power on the output market has effects on the 
input market. When the parastatal increases the price paid (pp) to the farmers the level of 
subsidy on urea decreases. 
In Equation 7 the first term represents the marginal increase in revenue when the 
input price is subsidized, equaling to the aggregated quantity transacted Zi. This increase 
in revenue is due to the increase of the cotton output as a result of the increased quantity 
of urea used. The second term represents the decrease in revenue as a result of 
subsidizing urea, with magnitude proportional to the slope of the urea supply curve.  
More elastic supply enables greater pricing power. Similar to Equation 3, the third term is 
also unique to the vertical coordination problem; it represents the how enacting pricing 
power on the input market has positive effects on the output market. When the parastatal 
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subsidizes urea, the farmers use the optimal level of urea and produce at the physical 
optimum level increasing the quantity of cotton produced. 
Taking the first derivatives of the farmers profit maximizing equation with respect to 
Xic, Xim, zi,, λland results in the following set of Equations:  
(8) 
 (  )
 (   )
                     
(9) 
 (  )
 (   )
                      
(10)  
 (  )
 (  )
                      
(11) 
 (  )
 (      )
                           
In Equation 8 the first term represents the marginal increase in revenue when the 
domestic cotton price increases; stimulating the production of cotton bringing in more 
productive growers; the second term is the loss in revenue when the shadow prices of 
land increases. Similar to Equation 8, the first term in equation 9 represents the marginal 
increase in revenue when the domestic price of maize increases encouraging the farmers 
to increase the area of maize planted in place of cotton, and the second term is the 
marginal loss in revenue when the shadow prices of land increases  For Equation 10 the 
first term is the marginal loss when the level of subsidy decreases meaning that the 
farmers have to pay a higher price for urea, and the second and third terms represent the 
increase in revenue when the cotton and maize output increases as a result of increase in 
the use of urea. Equation 11 is the land constraint.    
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CHAPTER V 
DATA AND PROCEDURES  
5.1 Data 
The data used in this thesis come from two different sources. The cotton world 
price is taken from the National Cotton Council of America economics data center, and 
converted from cents per pound to dollars per kilogram. An average for the period of 
2005-2013 of the “A” index1 price is used (Table 1). The “A” index price is not adjusted 
to transportation and other transfer costs. 
Table 1. Cotton - "A" index - Year Average prices 
Year "A" index Price ($/kg) 
2005 1.26 
2006 1.33 
2007 1.64 
2008 1.35 
2009 1.72 
2010 3.64 
2011 2.20 
2012 1.94 
2013 1.98 
Average 1.90 
Source: National Cotton Council of America 
 
 
                                                          
1
 The “A” index price is a proxy of the world cotton price.  
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The average production costs and mean annual yields for the typical three farm 
types
2
 are included in Tables 2 and 3, respectively. These data are taken from a survey 
that was developed and administered by INERA, the national agricultural institute of 
Burkina Faso over the summer and autumn of the years 2009, 2010 and 2011.  Each year 
a sample of 180 farmers were randomly selected and surveyed. The sample is taken from 
ten villages from the three major cotton growing areas in Burkina Faso. The data are then 
averaged across the three different farm types in the three cotton growing areas. 
Table 2. Summary of annual mean production costs averaged over three farm types 
across three production zones for the years 2009-2011. 
  Large ($/ha) Small ($/ha)  Manual ($/ha) 
n=180/year    
 
Bollgard II 
Insecticide  10.81 12.00 15.86 
Seed Cost 60.07 61.19 58.25 
Labor 147.92 142.08 138.83 
Fert & Herb 154.54 149.91 133.26 
Total Cost 373.34 365.18 346.20 
 
Conventional Cotton 
Insecticide  55.55 49.02 52.35 
Seed Cost 12.10 12.43 12.87 
Labor 140.48 139.13 132.92 
Fert & Herb 152.47 151.55 136.97 
Total Cost 360.59 352.13 335.11 
 
Cost Comparison: Bollgard II – Conventional Cotton 
BG II - Conventional  12.74 13.05 11.09 
Source: INERA. 
 
                                                          
2
 The farm types are defined as: Large farms are the ones where at least two draft animals 
are used in the field operations; small farms only use one draft animal, and manual farms 
are those where all the field operations are done manually (Vitale et al., 2011). 
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Table 3. Annual mean cotton yields 
Yield Item (Kg ha
-1
) FARM TYPE 
 n=180/year Large Small Manual 
Gene Type                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
2009 
   BG II  1189 848 550 
   Conventional  1045 661 168 
 2010 
   BG II  1692 1964 1259 
   Conventional  791 1007 816 
 
2011 
   BG II  1222 1153 1202 
   Conventional  983 969 974 
 
             2009-2011 Average 
   BG II  1368 1321 1004 
   Conventional  940 879 653 
Source: INERA 
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26 
 
5.2 Procedures 
To demonstrate the effect of the three alternatives to the parastatal vertical 
coordination in the total surplus distribution, equations 3 and 4 described in chapter IV 
are programmed in GAMS IDE
TM 
(General Algebraic Modeling System),
  
and maximized 
using a nonlinear programming algorithm. 
Maize is included in the structural model as the farmers can choose to grow either 
maize or cotton, but it is excluded from the GAMS IDE
TM 
program since at the time of 
this study there was not available detailed information on maize profitability to provide a 
decent comparison with cotton; instead the cotton break even condition is used, which is 
assumed to be a satisfactory measure to compare to maize profitability. 
The total land available to the farmers is fixed at 1,200,000 hectares. 
5.2.1 The Vertical coordination (Monopsony – Monopoly) case 
With vertical coordination the farmers and the parastatal are linked by contractual 
agreements. The parastatal maintains legal monopoly in the input market and legal 
monopsony on the output market, setting both the urea price (rp) charged to the farmers 
and the cotton lint price paid to the farmers (pp).  
Under this arrangement the parastatal surplus is maximized by solving the 
following objective function: 
(12)            (     )      ∑((     )        ) 
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where 0.4 is the ginning efficiency ratio, used to compare the local market cotton 
quantity and the competitive market cotton quantity, pw is cotton lint price in the 
competitive market in $/kg, pp is cotton lint price the farmers receive from the parastatal 
in $/kg, rw is the urea price in the competitive market in $/kg, rp is the urea price the 
parastatal charges the farmers in $/kg Qsi is the aggregated expected cotton quantity 
supplied by farmer i in kg,     is the area allocated to growing cotton by farmer i, and    
is the level of urea used by farmer i in kg/ha. 
With vertical coordination the parastatal profit maximization objective function is 
subject to the farmers satisfying the break even condition. The farmers break even 
condition requires that the farmer’s revenue must be greater than or equal to production 
costs in order for them to continue producing cotton. 
The break even condition is given by the following function: 
(13)                    (               
 )                
where Break eveni is the break-even for farmer i, pp is the demand price the 
parastatal pays the farmers for cotton lint in $/kg, ai is the intercept term of the yield 
response function for farmer i when no urea is used to grow cotton, bi is the coefficient of 
the linear term of the yield response function for farmer i, ci is the coefficient of the 
quadratic term of the yield response for farmer i, rp is the urea price the parastatal charges 
the farmers in $/kg, and 200 is the average marginal cost of growing cotton excluding the 
urea cost, in $/ha. 
The yield response function coefficients are estimated based on urea use and yield 
responses observed, and are determined as: 
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Manual Farms: a = 0, b = 6.3, c = -0.01; 
Small Farms:  a = 0, b = 7, c = -0.01; 
Large Farms: a = 0, b = 7.8, c = -0.01; 
where ai is the intercept term of the yield response function for farmer i when no urea is 
used to grow cotton, bi is the coefficient of the linear term of the yield response function 
for farmer i, and ci is the coefficient of the quadratic term of the yield response function. 
Given the coefficient estimates the yield response functions are defined as: 
Manual Farms:           
 
        
Small Farms:           
 
      
Large Farms:           
 
        
where     is the cotton yield for the i
th
 farmer in kg/ha, and   is the level of urea used in 
kg/ha. 
The level of urea used is a function of both urea and the cotton lint prices, given 
the urea (rp) and cotton lint (pp) prices set by the parastatal the level of urea used by the 
farmer is determined by resolving the following equation: 
(14)    
(        )
(       )
 
where zi is the level of the urea used by farmer i in Kg/ha, bi is the coefficient of 
the linear term of the of the yield response equation for farmer type i, ci is the coefficient 
of the quadratic term of the yield response for farmer i, pp is the demand price the 
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parastatal pays the farmers for cotton lint in $/kg, and rp is the urea price the parastatal 
charges the farmers in $/kg.  
The farmers are assumed to be price takers; the surplus by farmer type is 
determined by maximizing the following equation: 
(15)        (                   )       
where       is the maximum surplus for farmer i,   is the cotton lint price the 
parastatal pays the farmers in $/kg,     is the cotton yield for farmer i in kg/ha,     is the 
area allocated to grow cotton by farmer i,    is the urea price the parastatal charges the 
farmers in $/kg, and 200 is the average marginal cost of growing cotton excluding the 
urea cost, in $/ha.  
The total farm surplus is determined by summing the farm surplus across the total 
number (n) of farms, 
(16)          ∑       
 
   
The marginal cost is calculated as: 
(17)      
(             )
   
 
where    is the marginal cost of growing cotton for farm i,    is the cotton lint 
price the parastatal pays the farmers in $/kg, and       is the maximum surplus for 
farmer I, Qsi is the aggregated expected cotton quantity supplied by farmer i in kg. 
In all of the four market structures analyzed the aggregated cotton supply is 
determined using equation 1 described in chapter IV. 
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5.2.2 The Monopoly - Competition case 
The first alternative to the parastatal vertical coordination is to allow for the 
parastatal to keep monopoly control of the input market, while the farmers are allowed to 
sell their cotton production at the competitive market price. With monopoly control the 
parastatal sets the urea price, and the cotton price received by the farmers is linked to the 
competitive market price.    
The parastatal surplus in the monopoly-competitive case is determined as:  
(18)            ∑((     )        ) 
where 0.4 is the efficiency ginning ratio, and it used to compare the local market 
cotton quantity and the competitive market cotton quantity, rw is the urea price in the 
competitive market in $/kg rp is the urea price the parastatal charges the farmers in $/kg,  
    is the area allocated to growing cotton by farmer i, and    is the level of urea used by 
farmer i in kg/ha. 
Under the monopoly competition case the parastatal also maximizes the surplus 
subject to the farmers satisfying the break even condition. In this case the break even 
condition is given by the following function: 
(19)                    (               
 )                
where Break eveni is the break-even for farmer i, pw is the cotton lint price in the 
competitive market in $/kg, ai is the intercept term of the yield response function for 
farmer i when no urea is used to grow cotton, bi is the coefficient of the linear term of the 
yield response function for farmer i, ci is the coefficient of the quadratic term of the yield 
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response for farmer i,    is the urea price the parastatal charges the farmers in $/kg, and 
200 is the average marginal cost of growing cotton excluding the urea cost, in $/ha.  
Given the cotton lint competitive market price (pw) and the urea price set by the 
parastatal (rp), the level of urea used is determined as follows: 
(20)    
(        )
(       )
 
where zi is the level of the urea used by farmer i in Kg/ha, bi is the coefficient of 
the linear term of the of the yield response equation for farmer type i, ci is the coefficient 
of the quadratic term of the yield response for farmer i, pw is the demand price for the 
cotton lint in the competitive market in $/kg, and rp is the urea price the parastatal charges 
the farmers in $/kg. 
Under the monopoly-competitive case the farmers sell the cotton at the 
competitive market price (pw) with the urea price being set by the parastatal. The farmers’ 
maximum surplus is given by the following equation: 
(21)         (                 )       
where       is the maximum surplus for farmer type i,    is the cotton lint 
price in the competitive market in $/kg      is the cotton yield for farmer i in kg/ha,     is 
the area allocated to grow cotton by farmer i,    is the urea price the parastatal charges 
the farmers in $/kg, and 200 is the average marginal cost of growing cotton excluding the 
urea cost, in $/ha.  
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The total farm surplus is determined by summing the farm surplus across the total 
number (n) of farms, and is calculated by the following equation: 
(22)          ∑       
 
   
The marginal cost is determined by the following equation: 
(23)      
(             )
   
 
where    is the marginal cost of growing cotton for farm i,    is the cotton lint 
price in the competitive market in $/kg, and       is the maximum surplus for farmer i, 
Qsi is the aggregated expected cotton quantity supplied by farmer i in kg. 
5.2.3 The Competition - Monopsony case 
 The second alternative to the parastatal vertical coordination is to allow for the 
parastatal to remain as a monopsonist in the cotton buying while the farmers can procure 
the urea on the competitive market. Under this arrangement the farmers urea price is 
linked to the competitive market price while the parastatal sets the cotton lint price (pp) 
they pay to the farmers. The parastatal exercises market power in the output market and 
has to set a cotton price (pp) that satisfies the farmers break even conditions in order to 
make it attractive for the farmers to grow cotton.  
The parastatal surplus under the competition-monopsony case is maximized by 
solving the following equation: 
(24)            (     )      
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where 0.4 is the efficiency ginning ratio, and it used to compare the local market 
cotton quantity and the competitive market cotton quantity, pw is cotton lint price in the 
competitive market in $/kg, pp is cotton lint price the farmers receive from the parastatal 
in $/kg, Qsi is the aggregated expected cotton quantity supplied by farmer i in kg. 
The farmers break even condition for this case is given by the following equation: 
(25)                    (               
 )               
where Break eveni is the break-even point for farmer i, pp is the demand cotton lint 
price the parastatal pays the farmers in $/kg, ai is the intercept term of the yield response 
function for farmer i when no urea is used to grow cotton, bi is the coefficient of the 
linear term of the yield response function for farmer i, ci is the coefficient of the quadratic 
term of the yield response for farmer i, ,    is the urea price in the competitive market in 
$/kg, and 200 is the average marginal cost of growing cotton excluding the urea cost, in 
$/ha.  
Given the cotton lint price set by the parastatal (pp) and the urea price in 
competitive market (rw) the level of urea used is determined as follows: 
(26)    
(        )
(       )
 
where zi is the level of the urea (urea) used by farmer i in Kg/ha, bi is the 
coefficient of the linear term of the of the yield response equation for farmer type i, ci is 
the coefficient of the quadratic term of the yield response for farmer i, pp is the 
monopsonistic demand price the parastatal pays the farmers for the cotton lint in $/kg, 
and rw is the urea price in the competitive market in $/kg.  
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Under the competitive-monopsony case the farmers procure the inputs in the 
competitive market, and are required to sell the cotton to the parastatal, 
(27)        (                   )       
where       is the maximum surplus for farmer type i,   is the cotton lint price 
the parastatal pays the farmers in $/kg,    is the cotton yield for farmer i in kg/ha,     is 
the area allocated to grow cotton by farmer i,    is the urea price in the competitive 
market in $/kg, and 200 is the average marginal cost of growing cotton excluding the urea 
cost, in $/ha.  
The total farm surplus is determined by summing the surplus across the total 
number (n) of farms, and is calculated by the following equation: 
(28)          ∑       
 
   
The marginal cost is calculated as: 
(29)      
(             )
   
 
where    is the marginal cost of growing cotton for farm i,    is the cotton lint 
price the parastatal pays the farmers in $/kg, and       is the maximum surplus for 
farmer i, Qsi is the aggregated expected cotton quantity supplied by farmer i in kg. 
5.2.4 The Competition (free market) case 
 The last option is to allow for a competitive market where the farmer’s 
prices are directly linked with the competitive market prices, with the farmer’s surplus 
being directly affected by the changes in the competitive market price. Hence the 
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parastatal profit is equal to zero. It is assumed that under this conditions the farmers are 
free of credit constrains, being able to participate in the competitive market.  
The farmer’s surplus is determined by the following equation: 
(30)         (                 )       
where       is the maximum surplus for farmer type i,   is the cotton lint price 
in the competitive market in $/kg,    is the cotton yield for farmer i in kg/ha,     is the 
area allocated to grow cotton by farmer i,    is the urea price in the competitive market in 
$/kg, and 200 is the average marginal cost of growing cotton excluding the urea cost, in 
$/ha.  
The total farm surplus is determined by summing the surplus across the total 
number (n) of farms, and is calculated by the following equation: 
(31)          ∑       
 
   
In the competitive market case the urea use is a function on the cotton lint price 
and urea price in the competitive market; it is given by the following equation: 
(32)    
(        )
(       )
 
where zi is the level of the urea (urea) used by farmer i in Kg/ha, bi is the 
coefficient of the linear term of the of the yield response equation for farmer type i, ci is 
the coefficient of the quadratic term of the yield response for farmer I, pw is the cotton lint 
demand price in the competitive market in $/kg, and rw is the urea price in the competitive 
market in $/kg.  
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The marginal cost is determined by the following equation: 
(33)      
(             )
   
 
where    is the marginal cost of growing cotton for farm i,    is the cotton lint 
price in the competitive market in $/kg, and       is the maximum surplus for farmer i, 
Qsi is the aggregated expected cotton quantity supplied by farmer i. 
 
5.2.5 The GAMS program: 
*Model 
Set 
F_Area /A_small,A_medium,A_large/ 
Urea /Z_small,Z_medium,Z_large/ 
F_Surplus /FRM_Surpl_small,FRM_medium,FRM_large,FRM_Surpl_Total,Total_Surplus/ 
Yields /YLD_small,YLD_medium,YLD_large/ 
Ql /Q_S_small,Q_S_medium,Q_S_large,Q_S_Total/ 
Marginal /MC_Small,MC_medium,MC_large/ 
i /1*50/ 
Type /small,medium,large/ 
; 
alias(type, type1); 
Equations 
Profit 
Profit1 
Profit_Farm 
Profit_SFarm 
Supply 
Farmer_EZ 
Farmer_LZ(Type) 
Comp_OP 
Comp_IP 
P_o_min 
P_o_max 
P_i_min 
P_i_max 
Break_even 
Break_1even 
Break_2even 
Break_even_(Type) 
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Land 
Land_max 
Land_max1 
Land_max2 
Land_max_(Type); 
Parameter 
P_o_world 
P_i_world 
a,b,c 
a1,b1,c1 
a2,b2,c2 
a_(Type),b_(Type),c_(Type) 
Area 
Yield_calc 
Yield(Type) 
PI_Farm 
PI_Agg_Farm 
alpha_0 
alpha_1 
beta 
L_Supply 
PI_MZ_ha 
Z_opt 
Brk_Even 
PI_Calc 
Pct_Area(Type) 
Farm_Agg_Surplus(Type) 
Tot_Farm_Agg_Surpl 
Total_Surplus 
Q_S_Farm(Type) 
MC(Type); 
a_("small") = 0;a_("medium") = 0; a_("large") = 0; 
b_("small") = 6.3;b_("medium") = 7; b_("large") = 7.8; 
c_("small") = 0.01;c_("medium") = 0.01; c_("large") = 0.01; 
Pct_Area("small") = 0.15;Pct_Area("medium")= 0.70;Pct_Area("large")= 0.15; 
Area=500000; 
alpha_0=200000; 
alpha_1=7000; 
beta=6.5; 
L_Supply=1200000; 
PI_MZ_ha=-10000; 
Brk_Even = 200; 
Variables 
PI 
PI_MFarm 
PI_SFarm; 
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Positive Variables 
Q_S 
Q_D 
P_o 
P_i 
Z 
Z1 
Z2 
Z_(Type) 
Area_X 
Area_X1 
Area_X2 
Area_(Type) 
; 
* Data prices are in $/Kg 
P_o_world = 1.90;P_i_world=0.50; 
Q_S.L=3; 
P_o.L=0.001; 
Supply .. Q_S =E= 
                Sum(Type, Area_(Type)*(a_(Type) + b_(Type)*Z_(Type) - 
c_(Type)*Z_(Type)*Z_(Type) )    )  ; 
 
Comp_OP .. P_o =E= P_o_world; 
Comp_IP .. P_i =E= P_i_world; 
Farmer_EZ .. Z =E= (P_o*b - P_i)/(2*c*P_o); 
Farmer_LZ(Type) .. Z_(Type) =L= b_(Type)/(2*c_(Type)); 
Profit .. PI =E= 0.4*(P_o_world-P_o)*Q_S  - sum(Type, (P_i_world-
P_i)*Area_(Type)*Z_(Type)) 
                 + (L_Supply-sum(Type, Area_(Type)))*PI_MZ_ha; 
Profit1 .. PI =E= 0.4*(P_o_world-P_o)*Q_S 
                    -sum(Type, (P_i_world-P_i)*Area_(Type)*Z_(Type)) 
                 + (L_Supply-sum(Type, Area_(Type)))*PI_MZ_ha; 
Profit_Farm .. PI_MFarm =E= 0.4*P_o_world*(a + b*Z - c*Z*Z) - P_i_world*Z; 
Profit_SFarm .. PI_SFarm =E= 0.4*P_o_world*Q_S 
                    - sum(Type, P_i_world*Area_(Type)*Z_(Type)-Area_(Type)*Brk_Even) 
                    + (L_Supply-sum(Type, Area_(Type)))*PI_MZ_ha ; 
 
Break_even .. 0.4*P_o*(a + b*Z - c*Z*Z) - P_i*Z - Brk_Even =G= 0 ; 
Break_1even .. 0.4*P_o*(a1 + b1*Z1 - c1*Z1*Z1) - P_i*Z1 - Brk_Even =G= 0 ; 
Break_2even .. 0.4*P_o*(a2 + b2*Z2 - c2*Z2*Z2) - P_i*Z2 - Brk_Even =G= 0 ; 
Break_even_(Type)  .. 0.4*P_o*(a_(Type)  + b_(Type)*Z_(Type) - 
c_(Type)*Z_(Type)*Z_(Type) ) - P_i*Z_(Type) - Brk_Even =G= 0 ; 
P_o_min .. P_o =G= 0.00000000000001; 
P_o_max .. P_o =L= 3; 
P_i_min .. P_i =G= 0.00000000000001; 
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P_i_max .. P_i =L= 1.50; 
Land .. Area_X =E= alpha_0 + alpha_1*((P_o)**(beta)); 
Land_max .. Area_X =L= 0.25*L_Supply; 
Land_max1 .. Area_X1 =L= 0.50*L_Supply; 
Land_max2 .. Area_X2 =L= 0.25*L_Supply; 
Land_max_(Type) .. Area_(Type) =L= Pct_Area(Type)*L_Supply ; 
* Parastatal setting both price and quantity 
Model Vertical /Supply,Land_max_,Break_even_,P_o_min, P_o_max,P_i_min, 
P_i_max,Farmer_LZ,Profit/; 
Model Monopoly /Supply,Land_Max_,Break_even_,Comp_OP,P_o_min,P_o_max,P_i_min, 
P_i_max,Farmer_LZ,Profit/; 
Model Monopsony /Supply,Land_Max_,Break_even_,Comp_IP,P_o_min,P_o_max,P_i_min, 
P_i_max,Farmer_LZ,Profit/; 
Model Competitive /Supply,Profit_SFarm,Land_max_,P_o_min,P_o_max,P_i_min, 
Farmer_LZ,P_i_max/; 
Put Supply_Response; Put "      ";Put "P_o_world ";Put "P_i_world ";Put "P_o ";Put "P_i "; 
Loop(Yields, 
Put Yields.TL; 
); 
Loop(Ql, 
Put Ql.TL;); 
Loop(Marginal, 
Put Marginal.TL;); 
Put /; 
Put Result; Put "      ";Put "P_o_world ";Put "P_i_world ";Put "P_o ";Put "P_i "; 
Loop(F_Area, 
Put F_Area.TL; 
); 
Loop(Urea, 
Put Urea.TL; 
); 
Put /; 
Put Result1; Put "      ";Put "P_o_world ";Put "P_i_world ";Put "P_o ";Put "P_i "; 
Put "PI.L    ";Put "Q_S  "; 
Loop(F_Surplus, 
Put F_Surplus.TL;Put "   "; 
); 
Put /; 
* Vertical case 
Solve Vertical maximizing PI using NLP; 
Put Result; Put " "; Put P_o_world;Put " ";Put P_i_world;Put " ";Put P_o.L;Put "  ";Put 
P_i.L;Put " "; 
Loop(Type, 
Put Area_.L(Type); Put " "; 
); 
Loop(Type, 
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Put Z_.L(Type); Put " "; 
); 
Put "    ";Put /; 
Put Result1; 
Put " "; Put P_o_world;Put " ";Put P_i_world;Put " ";Put P_o.L;Put "  ";Put P_i.L;Put " "; 
Put PI.L;Put "  ";Put Q_S.L; 
Tot_Farm_Agg_Surpl = 0; 
Loop(Type, 
   Farm_Agg_Surplus(Type) =  Area_.L(Type)*(Break_even_.L(Type) - Brk_Even); 
   Tot_Farm_Agg_Surpl = Tot_Farm_Agg_Surpl + Farm_Agg_Surplus(Type); 
   Put Farm_Agg_Surplus(Type);  Put "   "; 
); 
Put Tot_Farm_Agg_Surpl;Put "   "; 
   Total_Surplus  = PI.L + Tot_Farm_Agg_Surpl; 
Put Total_Surplus; 
Put /; 
 
Put Supply_Response; 
Put P_o_world;Put " ";Put P_i_world;Put " ";Put P_o.L;Put "  ";Put P_i.L;Put " "; 
Loop(Type, 
Yield(Type) = a_(Type) + b_(Type)*Z_.L(Type) - c_(Type)*Z_.L(Type)*Z_.L(Type); 
Q_S_Farm(Type) = Yield(Type)*Area_.L(Type); 
MC(Type) = (Q_S_Farm(Type)*P_o.L  -  Farm_Agg_Surplus(Type))/Q_S_Farm(Type)  ; 
Put Yield(Type); Put "   "; 
); 
Loop(Type, Put Q_S_Farm(Type); Put "   ";   ); Put Q_S.L;Put "    "; 
Loop(Type, Put MC(Type); Put "   ";   ); 
Put /; 
Put Result; 
* Monopoly case 
Solve Monopoly maximizing PI using NLP; 
Put Result; 
Put Result; Put " "; Put P_o_world;Put " ";Put P_i_world;Put " ";Put P_o.L;Put "  ";Put 
P_i.L;Put " "; 
Loop(Type, 
Put Area_.L(Type); Put "    "; 
); 
Loop(Type, 
Put Z_.L(Type); Put "    "; 
); 
Put /; 
Put Result1; 
Put " "; Put P_o_world;Put " ";Put P_i_world;Put " ";Put P_o.L;Put "  ";Put P_i.L;Put " "; 
Put PI.L;Put "  ";Put Q_S.L; 
Tot_Farm_Agg_Surpl = 0; 
Loop(Type, 
41 
 
   Farm_Agg_Surplus(Type) =  Area_.L(Type)*(Break_even_.L(Type) - Brk_Even); 
   Tot_Farm_Agg_Surpl = Tot_Farm_Agg_Surpl + Farm_Agg_Surplus(Type); 
   Put Farm_Agg_Surplus(Type); Put "   "; 
); 
Put Tot_Farm_Agg_Surpl;Put "   "; 
   Total_Surplus  = PI.L + Tot_Farm_Agg_Surpl; 
Put Total_Surplus;  Put "   "; 
Put /; 
Put Supply_Response; 
Put P_o_world;Put " ";Put P_i_world;Put " ";Put P_o.L;Put "  ";Put P_i.L;Put " "; 
Loop(Type, 
Yield(Type) = a_(Type) + b_(Type)*Z_.L(Type) - c_(Type)*Z_.L(Type)*Z_.L(Type); 
Q_S_Farm(Type) = Yield(Type)*Area_.L(Type); 
MC(Type) = (Q_S_Farm(Type)*P_o.L  -  Farm_Agg_Surplus(Type))/Q_S_Farm(Type)  ; 
Put Yield(Type); Put "   "; 
); 
Loop(Type, Put Q_S_Farm(Type); Put "   ";   ); Put Q_S.L;Put "    "; 
Loop(Type, Put MC(Type); Put "   ";   ); 
Put /; 
Put Result; 
* Monopsony case 
Solve Monopsony maximizing PI using NLP; 
*Solve Vertical maximizing PI using NLP; 
Put Result; Put "      "; 
Put Result; Put " "; Put P_o_world;Put " ";Put P_i_world;Put " ";Put P_o.L;Put "  ";Put 
P_i.L;Put " "; 
Loop(Type, 
Put Area_.L(Type); Put "    "; 
); 
Loop(Type, 
Put Z_.L(Type); Put "    "; 
); 
Put /; 
Put Result1; 
Put " "; Put P_o_world;Put " ";Put P_i_world;Put " ";Put P_o.L;Put "  ";Put P_i.L;Put " "; 
Put PI.L;Put "  ";Put Q_S.L; 
Tot_Farm_Agg_Surpl = 0; 
Loop(Type, 
   Farm_Agg_Surplus(Type) =  Area_.L(Type)*(Break_even_.L(Type) - Brk_Even); 
   Tot_Farm_Agg_Surpl = Tot_Farm_Agg_Surpl + Farm_Agg_Surplus(Type); 
   Put Farm_Agg_Surplus(Type); Put "   "; 
); 
Put Tot_Farm_Agg_Surpl;Put "   "; 
   Total_Surplus  = PI.L + Tot_Farm_Agg_Surpl; 
Put Total_Surplus;  Put "   "; 
Put /; 
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Put Supply_Response; 
Put P_o_world;Put " ";Put P_i_world;Put " ";Put P_o.L;Put "  ";Put P_i.L;Put " "; 
Loop(Type, 
Yield(Type) = a_(Type) + b_(Type)*Z_.L(Type) - c_(Type)*Z_.L(Type)*Z_.L(Type); 
Q_S_Farm(Type) = Yield(Type)*Area_.L(Type); 
MC(Type) = (Q_S_Farm(Type)*P_o.L  -  Farm_Agg_Surplus(Type))/Q_S_Farm(Type)  ; 
Put Yield(Type); Put "   "; 
); 
Loop(Type, Put Q_S_Farm(Type); Put "   ";   ); Put Q_S.L;Put "    "; 
Loop(Type, Put MC(Type); Put "   ";   ); 
Put /; 
Put Result; 
* Competitive case 
Solve Competitive maximizing PI_SFarm using NLP; 
Put Result; Put "      "; Put P_o_world;Put "    ";Put P_i_world;Put "    ";Put P_o.L;Put "    ";Put 
P_i.L;Put "    "; 
Loop(Type, 
Put Area_.L(Type); Put "    ";); 
Loop(Type, 
Put Z_.L(Type); Put "    ";); 
Put Result1; 
Put " "; Put P_o_world;Put " ";Put P_i_world;Put " ";Put P_o.L;Put "  ";Put P_i.L;Put " "; 
Put PI_SFarm.L;Put "    ";Put Q_S.L;Put "    "; 
Yield(Type) = a_(Type) + b_(Type)*Z_.L(Type) - c_(Type)*Z_.L(Type)*Z_.L(Type); 
Q_S_Farm(Type) = Yield(Type)*Area_.L(Type); 
Tot_Farm_Agg_Surpl = 0; 
Loop(Type,  Farm_Agg_Surplus(Type) =  0.4*P_o_world*Q_S_Farm(Type) - 
                    P_i_world*Area_.L(Type)*Z_.L(Type) -Area_.L(Type)*Brk_Even  ; 
   Tot_Farm_Agg_Surpl = Tot_Farm_Agg_Surpl + Farm_Agg_Surplus(Type); 
   Put Farm_Agg_Surplus(Type);Put "   ";); 
Put Tot_Farm_Agg_Surpl;Put "   ";   Total_Surplus  = PI.L + Tot_Farm_Agg_Surpl; 
Put Total_Surplus; 
Put /; 
Put Supply_Response; 
Put P_o_world;Put " ";Put P_i_world;Put " ";Put P_o.L;Put "  ";Put P_i.L;Put " "; 
Loop(Type, 
Yield(Type) = a_(Type) + b_(Type)*Z_.L(Type) - c_(Type)*Z_.L(Type)*Z_.L(Type); 
Q_S_Farm(Type) = Yield(Type)*Area_.L(Type); 
MC(Type) = Brk_Even/Yield(Type); 
Put Yield(Type); Put "   ";); Loop(Type, Put Q_S_Farm(Type); Put "   ";   ); Put Q_S.L;Put "    
"; 
Loop(Type, Put MC(Type); Put "   ";   ); 
Put /; 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
6.1 The Vertical coordination (Monopsony – Monopoly) case 
With vertical coordination, contractual agreements require the cotton farmers to 
procure inputs provided by the parastatal and the parastatal has rights to purchase all of 
the cotton grown by the farmers. The area of cotton planted varies across the farm types 
and is assumed to remain  constant across the four different market arrangements, with 
the manual and large farms planting 180,000 hectares of cotton each, while small 
producers account for the largest share of the area planted (70%), with a total of 840,000 
hectares of cotton. This could be explained by the fact the parastatal does not price 
discriminate and sets a minimum price that allows for all farmers to satisfy the break 
even condition to ensure they engage in growing cotton.  
It is assumed that the farmers are price takers and that in the world market cotton 
lint is bought at $1.9/kg and the input, urea, is sold at $0.50/kg.  (For cases below where 
it is assumed that producers receive the market price, it is also assumed that 
transportation and handling costs are zero. This simplification will be relaxed in future 
research.) The results in Table 4 show that with vertical coordination, the parastatal sets 
the cotton lint price below the world market price and completely subsidizes the urea 
price, offering it to farmers free of charge to ensure the participation by each of the three 
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farmer types and the use of an optimal level of urea; however, the parastatal extracts rents 
from them on the output market. The farmers receive $0.50/Kg for cotton lint, which is 
$1.40/kg below the world cotton lint price.  
Table 4. Output and input prices set by the parastatal. 
Market structure pp ($/kg) rp ($/kg) 
Vertical coordination  0.5 0 
Monopoly – Competition 1.9 1.5 
Competition – Monopsony 0.86 0.5 
Competition 1.9 0.5 
 
With vertical coordination, a total economic surplus of $683.54 million is 
generated per year, and the parastatal collects the largest share of the benefits (91.98%); 
the manual farmers break even and do not receive any surplus (0%), the small farmers 
receive 5.31%, and the large farmers 2.71% of the total economic surplus. The high share 
collected by the parastatal under vertical coordination reflects the fact that the parastatal 
manipulates the input and output prices and extracts rents from the output market by 
setting the cotton price paid to the farmers at $0.5/Kg, below the competitive market 
price ($1.9/Kg). Furthermore, Equation 7 of the first order condition for the parastatal 
profit maximization suggests that the parastatal can enforce market power on the input 
market and use subsidies to provide the urea free of charge to the farmers to guarantee 
that they use an optimal level of urea to increase the cotton production, and extract rents 
on the output market. 
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Regarding the surplus distribution the model predicts that the distribution of the 
total economic surplus among the parastatal and cotton farmers is uneven along the four 
market structures considered (Table 5).  
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Table 5. Estimates of economic surplus and distribution under the four market structures. 
 
 
Surplus by Farm type (Million $) 
 
   
Market structure Parastatal  Manual Small Large Total farm  Total  
Vertical coordination  628.74  0 36.27 18.53 54.8 683.5 
 
91.98% 0% 5.31% 2.71% 8.02% 100% 
       
Monopoly– Competition 420.9 14.69 173.04 66.77 254.5 675.4 
 
62.32% 2.18% 25.62% 9.89% 37.68% 100% 
       
Competitive– Monopsony 615.89 0 37.09 22.58 59.67 675.5 
 
91.17% 0% 5.49% 3.34% 8.83% 100% 
       
Competition 0 72.9 473.9 138.5 685.3 685.3 
  0% 10.63%   69.16%  20.20% 100%   100% 
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Figure 9. Surplus distribution under vertical coordination. 
Figure 9 shows the surplus distribution under the vertical coordination case, in 
which the parastatal exercises market power on both input and output markets. As 
reported in Table 5 the large farmers’ surplus is equal to the area represented by the 
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vertical stripes and corresponds to a surplus of $18.53 million. The small farmers’ surplus 
is equal to the area of the diagonal stripes, which is equal to a surplus of $36.27 million. 
The manual farmers do not generate any surplus. The parastatal surplus is equal to the 
area represented by the horizontal stripes. 
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Figure 10. Yield and urea use by farm type across the four market arrangements (values 
in parenthesis are the level of urea used). 
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The maximum production level of urea use varies across farm type. For the 
manual farms it is 315 kg/ha, for the small farms it is 350 kg/ha, and for the large farms it 
is 390 kg/ha, corresponding to maximum yields of 992 kg/ha, 1,225 kg/ha, and 1,521 
kg/ha in the manual, small, and large farms respectively (Figure 10).  The parastatal 
maximizes profit subject to the farmers satisfying the breakeven condition. The urea 
allocation per farm type varies across the four different market structures; the small and 
the large farmers tend to behave similarly, while the manual famers behave differently 
when it comes to urea allocation. 
With vertical coordination, in which the total farm surplus is the smallest 
compared to the other market structures (Table 5), the farmers use urea below the 
maximum production level. The small farms use 304 Kg/ha, which is close to the 
maximum production level, and produce 991 kg of cotton per hectare. The small and 
large farmers also use less than the maximum production level of urea, using 305 kg/ha 
and 345 kg/ha and producing 1,205 and 1,501 kg of cotton per hectare, respectively 
(Figure 9). 
6.2 The Monopoly - Competition case 
One alternative to the parastatal vertical coordination arrangement in the cotton 
sector in West and Central Africa is to let the farmers to sell their production in the 
competitive market so they receive the competitive cotton price ($1.9/kg), and let the 
parastatal exercise monopoly control of the input market. Given this arrangement the 
parastatal would charge the producers $1 more above the urea world price ($0.5/kg), and 
the producers would have to pay $1.5/kg of urea. Despite the higher urea price charged 
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by the parastatal the higher cotton price in the competitive market ($1.9/kg) makes 
growing cotton attractive to the farmers (Table 4). 
The results in Table 5 show that with this arrangement the total economic surplus 
generated compared to vertical coordination case decreases by $8.1 million to a total of 
$675.4 million. The distribution of the surplus remains uneven, however the parastatal 
captures less than captured under the vertical coordination since the parastatal no longer 
exercises market power on the output market, and the farmers increase their share of the 
total economic surplus as a result of the higher competitive cotton price ($1.9/kg) 
received. The parastatal share decreases from 91.98% to 62.32%, and the total farm 
surplus increases from 8.02% to 37.68%. The larger beneficiaries of the higher cotton 
price received in the competitive market ($1.9/kg) are the manual farmers with their share 
of the surplus increasing from 0% to 2.18% relative to the vertical coordination case 
(Table 5). The small and large farmers capture 25.62% and 9.89% of the total surplus, 
respectively.  
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Figure 11. Surplus distribution under the monopoly-competition case. 
Figure 11 represents the surplus distribution under the monopoly-competition 
case where the parastatal as monopoly control of the urea price and the farmers sell their 
cotton at the competitive price. The large farmers’ surplus is equal to the area represented 
by the vertical stripes and corresponds to a surplus of $66.77 million as reported in Table 
5. The small farmers’ surplus is equal to the area of the diagonal stripes, which is equal to 
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a surplus of $173.04 million. The manual farmers’ surplus is equal to the area with the 
dots, which is equal to a surplus of $14.69 million.  
Under this arrangement the parastatal maximizes its surplus by extracting rents 
from the input market; however, all of the farm types produce cotton using the amount of 
urea that maximizes cotton production, because of the higher cotton price received in the 
competitive market. This allows them to increase farm surplus (Table 5). 
6.3 The Competition - Monopsony case 
Another alternative to the parastatal vertical coordination is to allow the farmers 
to procure inputs on the world market and let the parastatal act as a monopsonist in the 
cotton buying. In theory in a monopsony situation the price received by the farmers 
should be equal to the competitive market price ($1.9/kg) adjusted to tax and other 
transfer costs (World Bank, 2000). Under these conditions the parastatal pays the farmers 
$0.86/kg of cotton lint which is 36 cents more than the price offered under vertical 
coordination case (Table 4).  
 The total economic surplus decreases to $675.56 million, which is $7.99 million 
less than in the vertical coordination case. The parastatal captures the largest share of the 
surplus (91.17%), and the remainder of the total economic surplus is shared among the 
small (5.49%) and the large (3.34%) producers, with the manual farmers being penalized 
by the parastatal monopsonistic price and, similar to the vertical coordination case, 
capturing none of the total surplus generated. The results of the model show that the 
parastatal surplus is higher when it is allowed to exercise market power and extract rents 
on the output market rather than on the input market, because the output market is larger 
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than the input market. The farmers are negatively affected by the monopsonistic price of 
$0.86/kg the parastatal pays for the cotton; however, because farmers receive 36 cents/kg 
more with this arrangement the total farm surplus increases by 0.81% compared to the 
vertical coordination case. 
 
Figure 12. Surplus distribution under the competition-monopsony case. 
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Figure 12 shows the surplus distribution under the competition-monopsony; 
where the parastatal acts as a monopsonist and the farmers procure urea in the 
competitive market. As reported in Table 5, the large farmers’ surplus is equal to the area 
represented by the vertical stripes and corresponds to a surplus of $22.58 million. The 
small farmers’ surplus is equal to the area of the diagonal stripes, which is equal to a 
surplus of $37.09 million. The manual farmers do not generate any surplus. The 
parastatal surplus is equivalent to the area represented by the horizontal stripes. 
Whit this arrangement the farmers buy urea at the competitive market price 
($0.5/kg), the small and the larger farmers produce at the maximum production level of 
urea use. (This production level is a result of an assumption in the model that producers 
choose production levels based on break-even, rather than profit-maximizing use of urea 
amounts; the producers use the amount of urea allocated to them by the parastatal. A 
profit-maximizing producer would use less urea and produce some amount less than the 
maximum.) The manual farmers use 251 kg/ha, which is below their maximum 
production level, producing 951 kg/ha of cotton (Figure 10). The level of urea used by 
the manual farmers can be explained by the fact that these farmers are capital constrained 
and under these conditions they breakeven not generating any surplus. 
6.4 The Competition (free market) case 
The third alternative to the parastatal vertical coordination is to completely 
liberalize the cotton sector allowing for the farmers to procure inputs and sell their 
production in the competitive market. In a competitive market where the farmers benefit 
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from higher price incentives, receiving $1.9/kg of cotton lint and purchasing urea at 
$0.5/kg, the total economic surplus is maximized with all of the benefits accruing to the 
farmers. The total economic surplus reaches a maximum of $685.3 million (Table 5), of 
which 10.63% accrue to the manual farmers, 69.16% to the small farmers, and 20.2% to 
the large farmers; hence the parastatal surplus is zero (Table 5). These results are similar 
to the findings of Gourex and Macrea (2003) and Poulton (2004) that found on their 
studies that on the first years of the cotton market privatization the farmers benefit from 
higher price stimulus and maximize their surplus.  
57 
 
 Figure 13. Surplus distribution in the competitive market. 
The surplus distribution in a competitive market is shown is figure 13. As 
reported in Table 5, the large farmers’ surplus is equal to the area represented by the 
vertical stripes and corresponds to a surplus of $138.5 million. The small farmers’ surplus 
is equal to the area of the diagonal stripes, which is equal to a surplus of $473.9 million. 
The manual farmers’ surplus is equal to the area with the dots, which is equal to a surplus 
of $72.9 million.  
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In competitive conditions the three farmer types use urea levels below the 
physical maximum (Figure 10) and maximize the total farms surplus (Table 5). The 
manual farmers use 282 Kg/ha, the small 317 kg/ha, and the large 357 kg/ha of urea 
corresponding to yields of 981 kg/ha, 1214 kg/ha and 1510 kg/ha respectively. 
6.5 Summary/Comparisons 
The results of this thesis show that the parastatal captures the largest shares of the 
total economic surplus when allowed to enforce market power on both input and output 
market or each of them separately. The parastatal extracts more rents from the output 
market relatively to the input market, under vertical coordination the parastatal adjusts 
the input and output prices to extract rents from the output rather than from the input 
market. This result fails in reject the working hypothesis of this thesis that says that more 
rents are extracted from the output rather than input market.  
The farmers are better off with market privatization, with privatization the farmers 
benefit from higher price incentives in the competitive market. Furthermore, the farmer’s 
surplus increases when they are allowed to receive the competitive market cotton price. 
For instances, the farmers gain more when they can sell their production in the world 
market even when the parastatal is allowed to exercise monopoly control of the input 
market and over charges the farmers for urea. This result could indicate that the output 
market is bigger in size compared to the input market.   
The manual farmers are more sensitive to the cotton lint price; for instance they 
lose their surplus when the parastatal acts as a monopsonist and pays the producers poor 
prices compared to the competitive market prices.   
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The urea use varies across the four market structures; however the farmers tend to 
use the optimal level of urea (Figure 8) motivated by different incentives across the 
different market structures proposed. For instance in the vertical coordination case urea is 
supplied free of charge to guarantee that the producers use the optimum level of urea and 
produce close to maximum production level; in the monopoly-competition case the 
incentive is the higher cotton price received in the world market; on the competition 
monopsony case the farmers pay less for urea and receive a higher cotton price (Table 4) 
compared to the vertical coordination case; and finally on the free market case the 
farmers are motivated by the higher cotton price incentives received in the competitive 
market. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Privatization of the cotton sector in West and Central Africa has been proposed to 
remove market power and other market distortions to increase the sector welfare (World 
Bank, 2000). This thesis assessed the potential economic consequences of different 
market structures for the cotton sector in West and Central Africa using a structural 
model. The results show that the primary beneficiaries of departing from the current 
parastatal vertical coordination in favor of alternative competitive market structures in 
cotton sector in West and Central Africa are the farmers, by reason of the higher price 
received for cotton lint in the competitive market. The model shows that the economic 
surplus distribution among the farmers and the parastatal is unequal across the four 
market structures analyzed.  
The results from the model establish that the share of the cotton price captured by 
the farmers is more relevant to the change of the farmers’ surplus than is the urea price. 
The higher the share of cotton price received by the farmer the higher is the farmers’ 
surplus.  For instance, when it comes to partial privatization, the farmers are better off 
with a monopoly-competitive structure in which they are allowed to sell their production 
at the competitive market price with the parastatal maintaining monopoly control of the 
input market when compared to a competitive-monopsony structure where the parastatal 
is allowed to act as a monopsonist and let the farmers procure for urea at the competitive 
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market price. The manual farmers are the ones who benefit the most among the three 
producer’s types; unlike the other farm types under monopsony cases they simply break 
even and do not generate any surplus but the scenario inverts when they are allowed to 
receive the competitive cotton price and generate surplus. 
The parastatal extracts more in the output market than in the input market. With 
vertical coordination the parastatal captures the largest share of the total economic 
surplus and if the cotton market is privatized this scenario is inverted and the farmers 
capture 100% of the total economic surplus.  
This analysis does not address the performance or the degree of inefficiencies 
associated with the parastatal or destiny of the parastatal profit, since corruption and poor 
management have been an issue (Kaminski et al., 2009). It would be expected that in a 
competitive market the share of the parastatal surplus under vertical coordination would 
be transferred to the farmers; however, this is less likely to happen in West and Central 
Africa countries due to other institutional constraints (Vitale et al., 2009). 
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